Chile's innovative privatized pension system has been lauded as possible model for Social Security system overhauls in other countries, yet it has also been critiqued for not including a strong safety net for the uncovered sector. In response, the Bachelet government in 2008 implemented reforms to rectify this shortcoming. Here we offer the first systematic effort to directly evaluate the reform's impacts, focusing on the new Basic Solidarity Pension for poor households with at least one person age 65+. Using the Social Protection Survey, we show that targeted poor households received about 2.4 percent more household annual income, with little evidence of crowding-out of private transfers. We also suggest that recipient household welfare probably increased due to slightly higher expenditures on basic consumption including healthcare, more leisure hours, and improved self-reported health. While measured short-run effects are small, follow-ups will be essential to gauge longer-run outcomes.
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First-Round Impacts of the 2008 Chilean Pension System Reform
Jere R. Behrman, Maria Cecilia Calderon, Olivia S. Mitchell, Javiera Vasquez and David Bravo Systematic research on the effects of alternative pension systems is useful to enhance the scientific basis for policy evaluation in the retirement arena. One of the most interesting, perhaps the most interesting, country in this regard has been Chile, which since 1981 has become a laboratory for observing the impacts of pension privatization. Specifically, for 30 years Chile has had mandatory individual retirement accounts managed by private-sector providers known as Pension Fund Managers (AFPs, Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones). Formal-sector workers are required to save an annual 10 percent of their pay in their accounts, which offer some investment choice, and wherein they must preserve the funds until they reach retirement age.
Though the Chilean AFP system has numerous strengths, it has also been cited for paying low benefit levels and for having low rates of worker contributions (Berstein et al. 2006; Gill et al. 2005; Kritzer et al. 2011) . Accordingly, in July 2008, the government of President Michelle Bachelet initiated several system-wide reforms intended to strengthen the national safety net for both the young and the old (Diaz et al. 2009 ). This paper evaluates how one key element of the 2008 Chilean reform, namely the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria), influenced economic outcomes for targeted poor households with at least one member age 65 or older. We do so using the 2006 and 2009 Chilean Social Protection Surveys (EPS, Encuesta de
Proteccion Social) and linked information from administrative data about the respondents to investigate resulting changes in knowledge of and receipt of these new transfers as well as changes in outcomes such as household work and health status and expenditures on alcohol and cigarette consumption, health insurance, and ownership of consumer durables. 1 We address a wide range of outcomes because we posit that, as in standard economic household models, the reforms may have influenced behaviors in unanticipated or even undesirable ways from the policy perspective. Results indicate that targeted households with elderly individuals received about 2.4 percent more household annual income, with little evidence of crowding-out private transfers. We also suggest that recipient household welfare probably increased due to slightly higher expenditures on basic consumption including healthcare, more leisure hours, and improved self-reported health. While measured short-run effects are small, follow-ups will be essential to gauge longer-run behaviors.
Background
Chile's privately managed pension system has inspired reform in many other countries and is considered by some as a possible prototype for reform in the United States and elsewhere (Arenas de Mesa 2005; Arenas de Mesa et al. 2007; and Barr and Diamond, 2008) . Accordingly, in 2008 when the government launched a series of reforms, this aroused substantial international interest (Arenas de Mesa 2010; Kritzer 2008; Packard 2002; and Valdes-Prieto 2009 ). These changes were driven in part by the fact that many workers did not contribute much to the system; also benefit levels were projected to be low for those who failed to contribute at least 20 years and hence would be ineligible for a guaranteed minimum pension benefit.
The new safety net as implemented includes two big components: a) the Basic Solidarity Pension (PBS, Pension Básica Solidaria) mentioned above, that secures a minimum meanstested benefit for the elderly poor (age 65+) who do not satisfy minimum contribution requirements, and b) a pension top-up (APS, Aporte Previsional Solidario) that increases pension benefits for those who did contribute to the AFP system. In 2008, the PBS was set at US$105/month or about one-third of the minimum monthly wage of US$333, higher than the Minimum Pension Guarantee of US$187/month (Kritzer 2008) . The PBS benefit withdrawal rate is 100 percent for households with income above the governmental poverty threshold (Valdes-Prieto 2009). The PBS was initially targeted at the poorest 40 percent of the population; coverage is set to rise gradually to 60 percent by 2012. 2 In what follows, we use difference-in-difference analysis to examine the short-run impacts of the PBS targeted towards poor households with at least one member age 65+. 3
Old-Age 'Basic Solidarity Pension': the old-age Basic Solidarity Pension is a monthly benefit paid by the Chilean Government to those who (a) receive no other pension, (b) are age 65+, and (c) are deemed to be in the poorest half of the population according to their poverty score (measured as a "Ficha de Proteccion Social" score of 12,666 points or below). 4 2 Several other reforms were also instituted though they are not the focus here. The self-employed are now to be required to contribute to the individual accounts system with a phase-in; in 2012, their contribution rate will be 10 percent on 40 percent of their pay, and by 2015, their entire pay will be subject to the 10 percent contribution rate. Additionally, low-wage workers (those earning less than 1.5 times the minimum wage) are to receive a contribution subsidy by employers and the government. Survivor and disability insurance is being extended to working men and women to age 65 (before, women were covered only to age 60), and since women average lower disability rates, they will receive a refund of the excess charges into their individual account pensions. A benefit subsidy is to be paid to mothers age 65 or above who retire from 2009 on and who contributed at least once to an AFP and are in receipt of a solidarity or survivors pension. This benefit is computed as a per-child bond that earns a return from each child's birthdate until the mother reaches age 65. Finally, assets accumulated in workers' individual accounts are now divisible on divorce (which was only recently legalized in Chile), and both widows and widowers are now eligible for survivor pensions (previously only widows received the survivor benefit).
This benefit has been rolling-out gradually since July 2008 because it represents a large boost in poverty 3 More time must pass to measure the medium and longer-run impacts of the 2008 provisions. An alternative approach to that used in this paper would be to develop and estimate a structural life cycle model that could be used to stimulate counterfactuals under the pension reforms of 2008. A few authors have developed such formulations, but they have not used them to study the 2008 reform (Joubert 2010; Vélez-Grajales 2009 ). 4 During the first two years 2008-2010, the FPS score was used to assign the PBS benefit; however, since July 2010 the law establishes the use of a new tool called Puntaje de Focalizacion Previsional (PFP). This new instrument uses the same information captured by the FPS score but in a different way; giving relevance to the information that appears more related to the pension situation. A PFP score of 1,100 or lower was required for the period between July 2010 and June 2011 to be eligible for the PBS benefit. Table 1 here
The FPS score was provided from administrative data matched to the EPS respondents, so the FPS values used in the multivariate analysis below are the official scores and not self-reported.
To examine the first-round impact of the reform, we examine three sets of outcomes. The first set, shown in Table 2 , includes seven variables related to respondent knowledge of the reform and reports of PASIS/PBS 11 benefit receipt in 2009. 12 9 In 2009, the exchange rate between Chilean pesos (CLP) and the US dollar was 569.37 (CIA World Factbook, Only about one-quarter (25.9 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ci.html, accessed 28 August 2010). Household income is missing for one-fifth of the households. 10 Some 15.1 percent have FPS scores above the eligibility cutoff, about 31.1 percent have no FPS scores and we lack of information for whether or not 1.1 percent of households have a score. A natural interpretation is that respondents lacking an FPS scores were likely ineligible. 11 Before the reform was implemented in July 2008, some in the targeted population received the PASIS benefit which refers to the former Assistance Pension (Pension Asistencial). After the reform, this group received the higher PBS (paid to individuals 18 years or older who were PASIS beneficiaries prior to the reform who became PBS percent) of the respondents indicated that they had heard of the pension reform, though more probit estimates are presented for these variables. Two others are trichotomous (0 = incorrect; 1 = do not know; 2 = correct), so we use multinomial probits for these ( Table 5 presents marginal effects). Of key interest is the fact that the linear term for having someone age 65+ in the household is statistically significant in only one of the seven outcomes: respondents are significantly more likely to say they receive the PBS at the time of the 2009 survey if there is a household member age 65+. The linear term for being poor is statistically significant for five of the seven dependent variables; it is negative for having heard of the pension reform, having heard of the PBS for the elderly, having heard of the APS for the elderly, and not knowing 15 15 That is, responding they "do not know," as opposed to responding wrongly or correctly.
when the pension reform began. It is positive for having received the PASIS and having received the PBS. Thus, ceteris paribus, the poor are less-well informed than the non-poor but more likely to report receiving the PASIS/PBS targeted transfers. Of most interest are the interaction terms between having a person age 65 or older in the household and being poor. Among the seven dependent variables examined, only the one for having heard of the PBS for the elderly has a positive significant coefficient estimate. 
Conclusions
Our study is the first systematic effort to directly evaluate the short-run impacts of Chile's pension reform of 2008. We focus on a key component, the Basic Solidarity Pension or PBS for the elderly, directed towards poor households with at least one person age 65+. We find that, in 2009, the poor were less-well informed about the reform than the non-poor, but they were nevertheless more likely to report receiving the PASIS/PBS transfers targeted on the poor. One significant program impact is that respondents living in a poor household with someone age 65+ are more likely than others to have heard of the PBS for the elderly. We find a significant positive impact of the reform among the targeted poor having an older household member where respondents indicate receiving an annual US$105from PASIS/PBS transfers. There is little evidence of public benefits crowding-out private transfers. There is also some suggestion that the targeted transfers led households to boost expenditures on health, increase leisure, and improve self-reported health, with mixed effects on cigarette versus alcohol intake and on the composition of consumer durables.
This pattern might seem to be somewhat welfare-enhancing for poor households with at least one older member in 2009. Nevertheless, such a conclusion must be heavily qualified because, with the exception of the reduction in work hours of 1.6 hours per week, the estimated effects are small and none of the underlying coefficient estimates are significantly nonzero at the standard 5 percent level. These insignificant and generally small effects raise questions about what happened to the reported increased income from the increased PASIS/PBS as well as questions about how these impact patterns will evolve. Part of the answer, despite the impression of the estimates, may be in crowding-out private transfers received and inducing reductions in work. As has been noted elsewhere (e.g., Behrman and King 2008; King and Behrman 2009 ), there also are a number of reasons to expect adjustments over time in implementation of reforms and in private responses to those reforms. 16 16 A related observation in term often used in the 'impact evaluation' literature is that we are estimating "intent to treat" effects. But if there are implementation delays, the "intent to treat" group may be much larger than the "treatment of the treated" group, initially, even if eventually they become approximately the same over time.
Therefore, it will be very important, in the future, to monitor and evaluate the time pattern of a broad array of responses to the components of the Notes: N = 10,394; additional dummies included but not reported are: 1 if household did not apply for poverty score, 1 if do not know if household applied for poverty score and two interactions between the previous two variables and HH member >= 65y. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff). Also, respondent's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Double interactions
Linear terms -28.98 Notes: N = 20,788 (10,394 respondents each year). Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as controls. Year 2009 * Poor * HH member >= age 65 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
Notes: N ranges from 10,388 to 10,394 respondents each year. Reference category is non-poor (poverty score above the cutoff) + household did not apply for poverty score + do not know if household applied for poverty score. HH head's age, age squared and gender included as controls.
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